In 2012, tensions flared between China and the Philippines over plans to drill for oil in the Reed
Reed Bank is within its 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ), whereas the PRC sees it as part of the Spratly Islands, a group of 250 islets spread over 165,000 square miles that is claimed in its entirety by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam, as well as partially by Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines.
In 2005, the Philippine government awarded a contract to the U.K.-based oil and gas company Forum Energy, whose majority shareholder is Philex Mining Corporation of the Philippines, to conduct seismic surveys in the Reed Bank's Sampaguita gas field. Forum's surveys reportedly indicated the presence of 3.4 trillion cubic feet of gas-a potentially significant source of energy and income for the Philippine government. In February 2010, the Though Forum Energy has halted operations, the company reportedly plans to start drilling for gas in Reed Bank despite Chinese objections. The Philippine government promises that it will provide patrol ships and surveillance planes to protect Forum's exploration vessels.
Over the next few years the government of the Philippines intends to offer fifteen contracts for offshore exploration near Palawan Island, including the agreement with Forum. The PRC has firmly warned foreign oil companies against exploring in the South China Sea, over which it claims indisputable sovereignty, and Chinese ships have harassed several vessels that have tried.
Given the Philippines's intention to uphold its claim to Reed Bank, many commentators have warned that the tensions could escalate into violence if China intervenes to halt drilling (Buszynski 2012, 142; De Castro 2012, 216-217; Faby and Mugato 2012; Glasser 2012; Haddick 2012; "South China Sea" 2012; Storey 2011; Storey 2012, 58) .
This territorial row between China and the Philippines over the Reed Bank area has rekindled fears of an impending military conflict centered on the South China Sea's energy resources. The episode marks the most recent instance of a claimant state granting hydrocarbon concessions in a disputed territory in the South China Sea as way of exercising its jurisdiction.
International tensions centering on Reed Bank's hydrocarbon reserves initially emerged amid the oil crisis of the 1970s, when the pursuit of oil and gas resources transformed the tiny islets into a hotly contested area. During the 1970s, much as in recent years, oil exploration undertaken by Drawing on the case study of the initial round of disputes surrounding oil exploration in Reed Bank during the 1970s, this essay seeks to offer a historical perspective on one particular aspect of the larger international disputes in the South China Sea. By analyzing an earlier period of heightened tensions over Reed Bank's hydrocarbon resources, as well as revealing the ultimate resolution of these tensions, the article lends insight into the dynamics of present-day controversies in the area.
Transnational Capital and National Sovereignty
Starting in the early 1970s, the government of the Philippines began to pay serious attention to offshore oil exploration in the South China Sea. Geophysical research accelerated, and at the end of 1971 the Philippines granted sixty-five concessions for oil exploration in the area. Oriental Petroleum and Minerals Corporation drilled the first two offshore exploration wells northwest of Palawan in May and July 1971, but they came up dry. In 1972, Philippine president Ferdinand Marcos ratified a petroleum exploration law that allowed foreign oil companies to sign a "contract of service" with Philippine companies for exploration and development of the country's petroleum resources. The first concession granted in the Reed Bank area went to a joint venture called Fil-Am Resources as "part of an effort to strengthen Philippine claims in the South China Sea area contested by both Vietnam and China (as well as nominally by the government of Taiwan)" (Woodward 1980, 160) . Agreements with other foreign oil companies followed. The Philippine National Oil Company was formed to provide greater state control and increase investment in petroleum exploration and downstream marketing. Initially, no exploration took place at Reed Bank, and offshore drilling was limited to one well in the Sulu Sea (Wu 2010, 124-125 1975MANILA12464; 1975MANILA17960; Urano 1997, 559; Valencia 1985, 81-82; Woodward 1980, 160-161; ) .
In early 1976, an international consortium of three Swedish and seven Philippine companies gained concessions to explore petroleum resources at Templar Bank (part of the Reed Bank area). The consortium was to drill three wells over the first two years and one well per year thereafter for the remaining five years of the contract. The Swedish companies put up $32 million in venture capital for the first two years and $62 million for the next five years. The
Philippine partners contributed only their oil exploration concessions. 4 1976, 26; Moore 1979, 59; Urano 1997, 562; Valencia 1985, 82; Waijiaobu 1995 Waijiaobu , 1336 Wu 2010, 133 The Nansha Islands, as well as the Xisha, Zhongsha, and Dongsha Islands, have always been part of China's territory. The government of the PRC has time and again declared that China has indisputable sovereignty over these islands and their adjacent sea areas and that the resources there belong to China. Any foreign country's armed invasion and occupation of any of the Nansha Islands or exploitation of oil and other resources in the Nansha Islands constitute encroachments on China's territorial integrity and sovereignty and are impermissible. Any foreign country's claim to sovereignty over any of the Nansha Islands is illegal and null and void. (FBIS-CHI-76-116) 6 The PRC's statement came as a warning to the Philippines, as well as to Vietnam. The Soviet Union, Vietnam's supporter in its mounting tensions with China, firmly backed Vietnam's claim to the Spratly Islands and accused the PRC of an expansionist plot to encroach on the territory of neighboring countries and usurp their resources (FBIS-SOV-76-113; FBIS-SOV-76-138; Urano 1997, 560-561; Waijiaobu 1995 Waijiaobu , 1325 .
Hours after the PRC announced its indisputable sovereignty over the Spratlys and accused the Philippine-Swedish-American consortium of violating its territory, the foreign secretary of the Philippines, Carlos Romulo, countered by asserting that international law supported his nation's claim. As Romulo put it, "The Reed Bank is within the continental shelf of the Philippines which was declared by the Republic of the Philippines to be within the economic exploitation zone of the country in accordance with the United Nations convention of continental shelves in 1958" . According to Romulo, the Philippines had declared its right to explore and exploit its 200-mile economic zone in 1968 without encountering any international opposition (FBIS-APA-76-117; Urano 1997, 561; Waijiaobu 1995 Waijiaobu , 1323 . The Philippines's foreign partner, the Salen Company, backed this stance. A spokesperson for Salen stated that the PRC claim to sovereignty over Reed Bank had negatively influenced the company's operations. Salen's representatives held that the area in which oil exploration was being carried out clearly belonged to the Philippines, which had already convincingly refuted the PRC's claims to sovereignty (Waijiaobu 1995 (Waijiaobu , 1324 . In Salen's view, oil exploration could go on unimpeded. Investors in the Philippines were less confident. As soon as the PRC reasserted its sovereignty over all the Spratly Islands-including Reed Bank-the market for oil stocks in the Philippines tumbled. On June 15, the volume of trading had been 2.5 billion shares, valued at 65 million pesos. On June 16, volume dropped to 1.57 billion shares, valued at only 39 million pesos. Stock prices for Philippine oil companies also fell considerably. Leading entrepreneurs in Manila, including Marcos's friend and crony Herminio Disini, had investments in oil exploration and prospecting, so these fluctuations generated a great deal of anxiety in politically influential circles (Waijiaobu 1995 (Waijiaobu , 1327 (Waijiaobu -1328 . Philippine military units in the area were strengthened to protect oil exploration activities at Reed Bank, and air and sea patrols were increased (Scowcroft 1976 ).
Newspapers in the Philippines pointed out that the nation had long claimed the Reed Bank area as part of its sovereign territory. But, because of Reed Bank's proximity to the Spratly Islands (which the Philippines argued it was not a part of), Vietnam and the PRC each held that the area was part of their territory. Discovery of oil in the area had attracted international attention. When an American oil company joined the Philippine-Swedish oil exploration consortium, the situation grew even more complicated. The level of Soviet support for its Southeast Asian ally Vietnam, and the way that the United States would act to protect American economic interests, were both cause for concern. The Philippine press called on all countries involved to devise a method for resolving the dispute (Waijiaobu 1995 (Waijiaobu , 1326 . The pursuit of energy resources by the Philippines and other claimants' uncompromising response made observers doubt the possibility of a peaceful resolution.
Yet, even as tensions persisted, political actors made concerted efforts to avoid conflict. intended "to chase [the] Chinese Nationalists out of Itu Aba," vice-premier Deng Xiaoping had replied that the Nationalists still occupied Taiwan, which held far more importance to Beijing than Itu Aba. After pursuing the subject further, Marcos said that Deng had assured him that, for the time being, the status quo could continue even though the PRC regarded all the islands as Chinese territory. The PRC's minister of foreign affairs, Qiao Guanhua, indicated that talks on the subject could be pursued by the ambassador from the Philippines after his arrival in Beijing (1976MANILA11802).
On June 18, Romulo met with the PRC ambassador to the Philippines, Ke Hua, and explained that the Philippines would go on drilling for oil in the Reed Bank. Romulo received an invitation from Qiao Guanhua to visit Beijing in July to discuss contested claims to the Reed Bank area, but he asked that the visit be postponed until August because of ongoing negotiations with the United States regarding American military bases in the Philippines. Romulo told Chinese representatives that, in his earlier state visit to the PRC, Marcos had brought up Philippine claims to maritime territories off Palawan. The PRC's leaders, said Romulo, had asked Marcos to table discussion of the issue until the two countries followed through with plans to establish embassies in each other's capitals (1976MANILA11802; FBIS-APA-76-120; Waijiaobu 1995 Waijiaobu , 1328 Waijiaobu , 1329 Wu 2010, 126-127) . Romulo also reminded Chinese officials that the joint communiqué signed by Marcos and the late premier Zhou Enlai to establish diplomatic relations between the Philippines and the PRC had been "specific in mentioning that any dispute between the two nations be settled by peaceful means without the use or threat of force" (FBIS-APA-76-120).
Later in July, the Philippine ambassador to China returned from Beijing "empty handed"
after an attempt to obtain PRC support for, "or at least tacit acceptance of," the Philippine government's position on petroleum exploration in the Reed Bank area. The ambassadorial visit was intended to prepare the way for a visit by Romulo originally set for early August. representatives about how he expected China to react to the Philippines and Vietnam negotiating about the "Chinese territory" of the Spratlys, Marcos "shrugged and said that they seemed to accept the fact that there is a dispute about the islands and accept the status quo." When asked if he envisaged a trilateral negotiation, Marcos said it was "conceivable" (1976MANILA11802).
According to American diplomatic personnel, Marcos seemed to be laying the groundwork for an effort to enhance the quality of Philippine claims. While his exact objectives were not altogether clear, his "ultimate objectives" were not the small land areas in the Spratly Group, but rather the seabed areas in the Reed Bank and other associated regions which may have petroleum-bearing formations. While he will naturally take whatever he can get, it is doubtful that he really expects China to share any of the Spratlys per se with either the Philippines or Vietnam. His game, therefore, is apparently to advance claims to as much as he can credibly encompass, so that he can fall back to a North Sea type seabed partition which will give him something west of the Palawan Trench. 
The Philippines Strengthens Its Claim
Even as it pursued a negotiated solution to the Reed Bank dispute, the Philippines displayed a readiness to use military force to uphold its territorial claims. On July 27, 1976, President Marcos deputed patrol vessels that the Philippines had obtained from the United States and Japan to defend against possible foreign encroachments and protect its rights to new oil exploration areas (1976MANILA11093; Urano 1997, 562; Waijiaobu 1995 Waijiaobu , 1336 . Initially, the PRC did not respond to these actions by the Philippines, but Chinese press agencies hinted that the PRC might employ military force to reclaim its national rights to disputed islands occupied by Vietnam, the Philippines, and the ROC (Waijiaobu 1995 (Waijiaobu , 1338 .
As the Swedish-American-Philippine consortium moved forward with drilling at Reed Bank, the government of the Philippines enthusiastically trumpeted the results of oil exploration.
On July 19 the Energy Development Board of the Philippines issued a "progress report" on This prediction proved well founded. On August 3, Marcos publicly announced that gas and oil condensates had started to flow from the drill stem testing at Sampaguita No. 1. This news boldly headlined all local papers as an "oil strike." U.S. diplomatic communications, by contrast, skeptically reported that Philippine authorities were "giving this news a bigger play than it actually merits in a technical sense." To oil industry observers, "this news is encouraging in that it proves hydrocarbon deposits in the area, but discouraging because it is generally presumed that a gas deposit would not be economically exploitable from the Reed Bank area."
Despite these qualifications, news of the oil find motivated additional exploratory drilling and reinforced the Philippine government's "resolve to press its claim in the South China Sea" To give the impression that it had not done anything to upset the status quo, the Philippines maintained that it had already stationed troops on the island for several years.
Philippine officials thus denied that the takeover of Panata had taken place recently so as not to mar Chinese vice premier Li Xiannian's March 1978 visit to the Philippines, "but several knowledgeable sources reached in Manila say the government placed troops on the seventh island for the first time-or at least after a very long absence-within the last month" (Mathews 1978) . When asked about the landing of Philippine troops on Panata during his visit to Manila, Li Xiannian averred that no trouble would occur between the Philippines and China over the Spratly Islands that could not be resolved peacefully (Urano 1997, 565; Wu 2010, 127) . According to the interviewer, "although this distinction might be difficult to explain to the Chinese, who also claimed Reed Bank, Blix said the Swedish company had apparently held that the government of the Philippines had supremacy over the area and had accordingly obtained permission from the Philippines." According to a news report, Blix had said that, "as the Swedish company concerned had not asked for advice, his Ministry had found no reason to give it, adding that he had no comment on [the] U.S. government's motives for giving such advice." Perhaps playing naive, Blix went on to say that "Sweden had not heard of any Chinese reaction to Swedish oil drilling on Reed Bank, and that if oil was found, it was not the Swedish State, but a Swedish company operating in the area, which was answerable" (BBC Summary 1979).
In early 1979, Salen drilled a fifth well, Kalamansi No. 1, on the Templar Bank. No carbonate buildup was encountered, and the well was plugged and abandoned. Salen undertook an evaluation of the entire area to determine future exploration plans. In August 1979, a British group, London and Scottish Marine Oil, farmed in for 20 percent, while another group, Filipino Partners, farmed in for 12.9 percent ( Oil & Gas Journal 1979, 58; Valencia 1985, 82-83 (Valencia 1985, 83; Wu 2010, 134) .
Over two years later, Salen's president, Henric Ankarcrona, acknowledged that it had met with minimal success in gas production from wells in the Reed Bank. The company was thus taking everything on a "well-by-well basis." Salen reduced its role to that of a participant, and the Canadian company Denison Mines took over as operator. When asked about the possibility of a liquid natural gas facility in the Reed Bank, Ankarcrona answered that it was still "a little too early to tell." Ultimately, commercially viable quantities of oil never appeared in Reed Bank in the 1980s, though all parties still believed the area to have good potential ("Salen Energy Spreads Operations Vertically" 1984, 88) .
11 With commercial oil exploration on hold, international tensions waned.
Conclusion
As rather than a net importer. Since the mid-1990s, however, the PRC's leaders have come to recognize China's dependence on oil imports and started to seek new energy sources in order to sustain China's expanding economy (Buszynski 2012, 142) .
Militarily, China possessed a far less formidable navy in the 1970s than it has today. Given China's lack of economic and naval power at the time, the PRC did not have the willingness, the capacity, or even the need to assert its territorial claims. The situation in the 1970s stands in contrast to the current state of affairs. Over the past decade, the People's Liberation Navy (PLAN) has pursued expansion and modernization, creating a rising power asymmetry in the South China Sea that clearly favors the PRC. The South China Sea Fleet was the weakest Chinese fleet in the 1970s, but now it is equal or superior to others ( Buszynski 2012, 142, 145-148; Ciorciari and Weiss 2012, 63; Emmers 2010, 121) . The Philippines, as well as other Southeast Asian nations, have expressed concern about the shifting power balance and fear that the PRC's recently acquired naval capabilities will enable it to resolve the sovereignty issue militarily. Despite efforts to modernize and upgrade its military, the naval capabilities of the Philippines are weak compared to those of the PRC (Ciorciari and Weiss 2012, 63; Emmers 2010, 124) . Nor can the Philippines count on external assistance to counterbalance China's naval On the other hand, he adds, policy makers "should never underestimate the possibility for minor disputes to escalate beyond their control." The Philippines has moved closer to the United States because of concerns about China's competing claims to the Spratly Islands, and these moves have drawn Chinese criticism (Rogers 2012, 89) . 12 More than anything, the increasingly fractious and potentially dangerous incidents like the one that occurred at Reed Bank in 2012 highlight the need for multilateral conflict avoidance mechanisms in the South China Sea that can institutionalize avenues for nonviolent cooperation (Emmers 2010, 125) .
It is worth noting that competition for oil and natural gas in the South China Sea depends not only upon nation-states' claims to these offshore energy deposits but also upon technological capacity to access these resources. Offshore oil and gas production often costs much more than production from conventional reserves. If exploitation of oil and natural gas deposits proves uneconomical, as with past ventures at Reed Bank, tensions are likely to fizzle out. Today, as in the 1970s, countries such as the Philippines depend upon foreign technology, expertise, and investment for marine energy exploration. The Philippines, Vietnam, and other claimants seek ties with foreign oil firms "both for commercial reasons and to give foreign partners a stake in the territorial disputes" (Ciorciari and Weiss 2012, 64) . Multinational corporations like Salen and Amoco can spark tensions through pursuit of commercial opportunities and profit. When energy exploitation ventures appear unprofitable, corporations opt to withdraw.
Unlike in the 1970s, the PRC currently possesses the technology needed to produce deepwater petroleum and gas (Rogers 2012, 87-88 
Notes

1
Klare goes so far as to claim that, out of all the world regions he considers, "the South China Sea is the area most likely to witness large-scale warfare," because it possesses all the factors that he associates with resource conflict. "There is the evidence of untapped reserves of oil and natural gas, along with a complex mosaic of overlapping territorial claims. All of the states involved in these disputes seek to maximize their exploitation of marine resource zones, and all have demonstrated a willingness to employ force in the protection of offshore interests." All the states have also "beefed up" their naval and air force capabilities. What is more, the United States, China, and Japan "possess vital interests in the area and are prepared to defend these interests with military means if necessary." This perfect storm of factors greatly increases the probability of military confrontation. As he concludes, "Any such confrontation is likely to commence as a naval incident sparked by competing claims to one of the Spratly Islands" (Klare 2002, 136) . 2 Rogers cites U.S. estimates of about 15.6 billion barrels of petroleum (of which about 1.6 billion are recoverable) and Chinese surveys estimating between 105 billion barrels and 213 billion barrels, with between 10.5 billion barrels and 21.3 billion barrels that are recoverable, in addition to high volumes of natural gas (2012, 87 The Swedish consortium included Salen as general manager, along with Kema Nord, Swedish Match, and Oiexplo. In addition to Seafront, the Philippine partners consisted of Marsteel Corporation, Imperial Resources, Oriental Petroleum, Philippine Oil Development Company, Pacifica, and Jappract Mining and Industrial Corporation (1976MANILA01623). 5
The Sampaguita No. 1 well was drilled to a depth of 4,125 meters (13,530 feet) and yielded 3.7 million cubic feet (0.1 million cubic meters) of gas per day in the interval of 3,150-3,160 meters (10,332-10,365 feet) from Paleocene sands deposited under deltaic conditions. The well was soon plugged and abandoned, but it confirmed the existence of good source and reservoir rocks under Reed Bank, as well as a thick tertiary sedimentary section (Valencia 1985, 82; Wu 2010, 133) . 6
Translation edited slightly based on the original Chinese version (Han 1988, 456) . 7
Taiwan's diplomatic representatives believed that recent harassment of their mission in the Philippines, as well as the "closure of a popular Chinese-language TV and radio show featuring Taiwan stars and music," owed to the Philippine government's desire to obtain the PRC's agreement to its claim to the Reed Bank (1976MANILA11199). 8
The public report noted that "target depth of 13,500 feet has been reached and electric logging is about to begin followed by drill stem testing." The report also pointed to the existence of "hydrocarbon bearing zones" at a depth of approximately 10,000-10,400 feet, plus two other "interesting zones" at 11,200 feet and 12,700 feet (1976MANILA10694). 9
One unnamed trade source told the U.S. embassy that investors hoped that the report would push stock prices for Seafront and Imperial (two local members of the consortium) to 4 centavos per share, "whereupon very well-connected insiders planned to sell out." Unfortunately for the speculators, however, "the public did not rise to the bait" (1976MANILA10694) .
10
The first well, which cost $3 million, was drilled in April to May 1977 to test a large structure with horizons correlative to the Eocene-Cretaceous sandstones that showed gas in Sampaguita No. 1. A second well with the same cost was drilled from May to August 1977 on the southeastern edge of Reed Bank to test a faulted anticlinal structure with horizons similar to the first well (Valencia 1985, 82) . In February 1978 the Cities Service Group, a U.S.-Philippine consortium led by the American Cities Service, hit oil at over 7,000 feet at the West Nido well in the Palawan Sea, marking the fifth oil find in the previous three years in the vicinity. Officials from the Cities Service Group finalized a $30 million development program in March 1978 for commercial oil production at the Nido complex. Plans for development in the area included two more platforms from which crude oil could be blown through a subsea pipeline to a single oil storage system (Urano 1997, 564; FBIS-APA-78-046; FBIS-APA-77-208) . 11
The Philippines Oil Development Company ultimately ceased operations in May 1982 due to a lack of capital (see Valencia 1985, 83) . 12
The Philippines and Vietnam have both tried to strengthen ties with the United States as a way to counterbalance PRC naval power (Buszynski 2012, 149, 151; Ciorciari and Weiss 2012, 65) . 13 Nationalist sentiments similarly hamper cooperative relations between China and Vietnam (Ciorciari and Weiss 2012) .
